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Abstract—The anticipated explosion in the total data trafﬁc
load will impose to mobile network operators (MNOs) the
necessity to densify their networks to provide coverage. At
the same time, since MNOs plan their networks according to
their high-peak trafﬁc load, base station underutilization during
the low trafﬁc hours raises the issue of unnecessary power
consumption and excessive cost. In the present paper, we plan to
study the energy and cost efﬁciency of a heterogeneous network
(HetNet) that is a cooperation result of many MNOs. Each MNO
is owner of a HetNet, composed of eNodeBs (eNBs) and small
cells (SCs) and they cooperate by sharing their infrastructure and
by switching off a part of it. BS type and trafﬁc load constitute
switching off criteria and a roaming cost based user association
scheme is used to roam trafﬁc to neighbouring BSs. We assess
the cost alterations created by the possible MNO coalitions and
we propose a bankruptcy game to allocate the obtained cost to
the cooperative MNOs and to motivate thus them to maintain
their sharing agreement instead of following a non-cooperative
tactic. The bankruptcy game uses Shapley Value to portray each
MNO’s contribution to cost savings. The MNOs’ satisfaction from
their payoffs (i.e., the allocated cost) and the overall fairness of
the method are evaluated. According to the extracted results, the
proposed switching off scheme achieves signiﬁcant improvement
of energy efﬁciency for the studied network, while the proposed
bankruptcy game achieves a balanced and satisfactory cost
allocation for different MNO trafﬁc loads.
Index Terms—Switching off, network sharing, cost allocation,
bankruptcy theory, Shapley Value.
I. INTRODUCTION
A huge augmentation of the mobile-connected devices per
capita is expected by the end of 2021 according to recent
studies (about 1.5 mobile-connected devices per capita) [1].
Mobile network operators (MNOs) will thus have to be able
to live up to the demands of their subscribed user equipment
devices (UEs) and cover their trafﬁc. Triggered by their need
to increase their network capacity, MNOs have embraced
heterogeneous networks (HetNets), which allow the addition
of extra base stations (BSs), such as macrocell BSs (MBSs),
or eNodeBs (eNBs) for the Long Term Evolution Advanced
(LTE-A) networks and small cells (SCs). However, capacity
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and coverage augmentation through installation of extra infras-
tructure would oblige MNOs to confront two raising issues:
energy and cost efﬁciency of their network.
On one hand, network densiﬁcation is related to increased
needs of electrical energy for its operation and thus to higher
CO2 emissions. It has been estimated that information and
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure is responsible
for the 2% and 3% of total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
and power consumption, respectively. Increased power needs
are translated into an electricity bill of more than 10 million 
[2], with BSs contributing up to 60-80% to the total energy
consumption. Thus, a greener approach of network operation is
projected as a necessity that cannot be neglected when reduced
network capital and operational expenses (CapEx, OpEx) and
lower CO2 emissions are set as aims.
On the other hand, MNOs need to reassure that the business
model they follow for the operation of their network results in
positive revenues. A dense single-handled network can prove
to be very challenging ﬁnancially for the owner MNO given
the increasing trafﬁc volume, while recently MNOs noticed
for the ﬁrst time a decrease in their revenues [3]. Recent
researches, e.g., [4] and [5], indicate the tendency of industry
operators to act against this phenomenon and proceed to
network sharing agreements of different types, such as passive,
active and roaming-based sharing [6]. Thus, they enable key
drivers of their interest, i.e., reduction of the cost attributed to
additional capacity and coverage by sharing bills [7].
Even though a viable network sharing agreement needs to
result in energy and cost savings for the shared network, it
also presumes a successful and fair cooperation among MNOs.
Being already reluctant to refrain from the traditional stand-
alone business model of managing only their own trafﬁc,
MNOs would not proceed to the new business model of
sharing agreements unless it resulted in (a) higher proﬁt
compared to the stand-alone one and (b) fair treatment among
cooperative MNOs.
Considering all the above, infrastructure switching off and
sharing have been embraced as approaches that can contribute
to both energy and cost saving. Given that networks are
planned to serve trafﬁc demands during the high-peak trafﬁc
hours, the phenomenon of underutilized infrastructure during
low-trafﬁc hours has arisen and been further aggravated with
the adoption of dense HetNets. A HetNet could lead to
considerable energy and cost savings, since it is composed
of not only high power consuming (~1.35 KW [8]) eNBs but
also numerous SCs. Due to their big number, SCs can create a
signiﬁcant aggregated amount of power consumption, despite
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the fact that an individual SC is less power consuming than an
eNB. As far as infrastructure sharing is concerned, hyper-dense
HetNets in urban populated areas can lead to a BS instalment
in close proximity due to scarcity of available space [9]. Thus,
it can only motivate MNOs to share their infrastructure and
their operational expenses (OpEx). For the owner MNOs that
see their revenues progressively decreasing from the adoption
of the individual operation of their network, such a movement
could be a sigh of relief for their expenses [3]. For the
success of an infrastructure sharing though, there needs to be
sincerity by the cooperative MNOs. Apart from realising and
acknowledging the economic beneﬁts of sharing, an incentive-
based policy must be put in place, as a way of encouraging
and growing the culture of infrastructure sharing on a level
playing ﬁeld. To that end, cost allocation methods can be used
to fairly allocate the costs among the members of a group.
An appropriate cost allocation ensures less disgruntlement to
the MNOs, especially if it is representative of their individual
contribution to any cost saving achieved by their cooperation.
Such a strategy would allow them to still have control of their
investments and maintain their growth strategies.
With regard to the existing related work, signiﬁcant re-
search has been devoted to BS switching-off algorithms in
both single-operator networks ( [10]–[13]) and multi-operator
networks, where concerns about cost and revenue issues for
network sharing are raised [14]–[18]. However, there are still
open issues that should be given further consideration when it
comes to the adoption of BS switching off in a multi-operator
shared HetNet, as well as to the application of a cost allocation
method. Energy savings should be achieved while taking into
consideration the kind of infrastructure that should be switched
off, i.e., eNB or SCs, as well as the network to which
the infrastructure belongs. Moreover, the employed network
sharing, if there is any, should be given consideration in the
switching off strategies as it can strongly affect the proﬁtability
of a possible MNO coalition. Furthermore, a cost allocation
has to address efﬁciently fairness issues among the MNOs.
Even though the validity of a coalition and the proﬁtability of
each MNO itself are dependent on the fairness of an allocation
of the network expenses, fairness issues have been given slight
consideration so far on issues such as resource allocation [19].
The contribution of this paper is twofold:
• We study the low-trafﬁc hour energy and cost efﬁciency
of an extended HetNet, which is a collaboration result of
multiple MNOs whose individual HetNets are located in
a certain area. More speciﬁcally, we describe the cooper-
ation of the MNOs as an application of the switching off
technique to the eNBs and SCs of their roaming-based
shared HetNets. We adopt a form of roaming-based shar-
ing [6], according to which an MNO can roam its trafﬁc
to a rival MNO during a pre-deﬁned period of time over a
strictly pre-deﬁned area. We formulate an energy efﬁcient
optimization problem and propose a cooperative greedy
heuristic algorithm, namely Cooperative Switching Off
(CSO), for its solution. We consider the type and load of
a BS as criteria for the BS switching off selection and
we propose a cooperative roaming-based UE association
(UA) scheme to deﬁne the operation states of eNBs and
SCs. CSO has the beneﬁts of being (i) conceptually rather
simple, (ii) easy to implement, and (iii) efﬁcient so as
to encounter a conﬁguration of BS operation and UE
association states that improves energy efﬁciency of the
extended HetNet meanwhile capturing cooperation issues.
• Regarding the cost issues raised from a collaboration
agreement that includes CSO, we model the cooperation
and cost sharing decisions among MNOs using a Shapley
Value based bankruptcy game (BSV). The bankruptcy
game represents the idea of allocating a speciﬁc entity
among a group of players who are interested in it [20]–
[22]. In the present case, we use it to estimate the
saved cost achieved from different coalition decisions
among MNOs, in comparison to a non-cooperative net-
work activity. Shapley Value (SV), thanks to the fairness
characteristic it has as a method, is used to determine
the individual contribution of each MNO to the total
cost savings that eventually deﬁnes its allocated cost, in
combination with its respective roaming revenues. The
proposed scheme is also evaluated with respect to the
fairness issues created among MNOs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
brieﬂy reviews the related work. The system model, network
conﬁguration and notation followed throughout the paper
are presented in Section III. In Section IV, we describe the
proposed switching off scheme, while Section V analyses the
coalitional bankruptcy game. A performance assessment of
our proposals are provided in Section V. Finally, Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Since network infrastructure is the most power consuming
part of the network, extensive work has already been devoted
to energy saving strategies, such as [23] and [24]. Switching
off algorithms have been presented towards this effort for both
single- and multi-operator networks. Indicative examples for a
single-operator HetNet are [10], where open-access femtocells
are switched ON and OFF dynamically provided that a power
saving UA scheme can reassure the service of UEs and [11],
where a distributed graph based game that enables BSs to op-
timise their switching strategies for energy saving meanwhile
guaranteeing the minimum service of their UEs is proposed.
In addition, [12] presents a different switching off procedure
that is applied to SCs only, depending on the UE distribution
within each SC area. In detail, when UE distribution within
each SC area is (a) uniform, SCs are switched off dynamically
according to their distance from the central eNB and (b) non-
uniform, SCs are switched off according to power saving lists
that are formatted based on a power saving efﬁciency indicator
Q. In both cases, SC deactivation is applied with trafﬁc
ofﬂoading to the eNB and until either no further improvement
of the HetNet power consumption can be achieved or the eNB
has reached its capacity or power limitations. Two sleeping
schemes are also presented and compared in [13]: (a) a random
one and (b) a trafﬁc load based one, with the trafﬁc load
being counted as the number of the nearest to the BS UEs.
A common characteristic of the aforementioned works is their
focus on the dynamic BS operation by a single operator.
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Our work sets the focus on multi-operator scenarios, where
infrastructure sharing can be adopted. Towards this direction,
the authors of [14] and [15] study the relations between
multiple MNOs and a third party. More speciﬁcally, in [14],
they propose a non-cooperative auction-based game that aims
at MNOs switching off their eNBs by totally ofﬂoading the
eNB trafﬁc to leased from a third party SCs, and in [15],
they refer to cost sharing policies with reference to a third
party. Other works consider only multi-operator scenarios.
In detail, [16] discusses the deployment of extra SCs by
cooperative MNOs based on the achievable UE throughput and
the individual MNO revenues, as a result of their respective
investments and the payments of their UEs. Moreover, [17]
refers to a budget-balanced mechanism designed for MNOs
of cellular networks with similar load distributions, while in
[18] cellular network operators switch off their networks in a
non-cooperative manner, aiming at energy efﬁciency. However,
works of [17], [18] do not consider a HetNet scenario, which
is a characteristic that could differentiate the results. Moreover,
their discussion on the revenues issues is based on payment
only agreements, without considering pricing differentiations
among different types of BSs or cost sharing methods. Unlike
the aforementioned works, in our work, we study purely
MNO-dominated scenarios, providing a switching off solution
that incorporates multiple network characteristics, such as
trafﬁc load, BS type and variable roaming charges, while we
provide a novel fair cost sharing solution that reassures the
proﬁtable network operation.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In the present section, we will describe the system model
on which we based our study and the technical details we
considered for the network conﬁguration, as well. The section
also serves as an explicit guide for the basic notation we follow
in the rest of the paper.
A. Network System Model and Operation
We study a densely populated macrocell-sized urban area A,
where multiple MNOs, indexed by n, n ∈ N  {1, .., |N |},
have located their LTE-A HetNets, as in Fig. 1. We assume
that each n ∈ N is owner of a HetNet, composed of one
eNB, located in the centre of A and uniformly distributed
small cells (SCs) in the rest of it. Let mn be an eNB m
of MNO n, mn ∈ Mn  {1, .., ∣∣M|N |∣∣} and sn a SC
s of MNO n, sn ∈ Sn  {1, .., ∣∣S |N |∣∣}. Thus, a Het-
Net Ln = {1, ..., ∣∣M|N |∣∣ , ∣∣M|N |∣∣+ 1, .., ∣∣M|N |∣∣+ ∣∣S |N |∣∣}
is composed for each n, which we index with ln. In or-
der to facilitate notation in cases irrespective of the owner
MNO n, we index with m an eNB of all eNBs in
A, m ∈ M = M1 ∪ .. ∪ M|N | and a SC of all
SCs in A with s, s ∈ S = S1 ∪ .. ∪ S |N |. Finally, let
l, l ∈ L = M∪ S = {1, .., |M| , .., |M|+ |S|}, be a BS of
the uniﬁed infrastructure, irrespective of both BS type (eNB
or SC) and owner MNO.
We moreover assume that each n ∈ N is the service
provider MNO for a group of UEs that are uniformly dis-
tributed in the studied area. If Kn (t) is the expected number
of MNO n for the duration of hour t, then let kn be a UE k of
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Figure 1. Studied macrocell-sized area A, where N MNOs have located and
share their HetNets. The shared HetNet of N consists of L BSs in total (with
l ∈ L), |M| eNBs and |S| SCs and it provides service to the total set of the
subscribed UEs, K (with k ∈ K).
MNO n, kn ∈ Kn (t)  {1, .., |Kn (t)|}. Under the roaming-
to-all assumption among the MNOs, we represent the total
group of UEs that has to be served from all N cooperative
MNOs with K (t) = K1 (t) ∪ K2 (t) ∪ .. ∪ Kn (t). Each UE
k ∈ K (t) has a speciﬁc guaranteed bit rate demand, denoted
by ρk (t). We assume that there are |I| different categories
of data throughput demands ri, i ∈ I = {1, 2, .., |I|}. If
g(i) is the random probability with which a data throughput
demand ri can be corresponded to a UE, with gi ∈ [0, 1] and
g1 + .. + gi + .. + g|I| = 1, then, ρk (t) may be equal to ri
with a random probability gk,i(t) ∈ {g1, g2, .., gi} during t. It
is noted that, in the general case, |I| may be equal to |K (t)|,
as each k may have different throughput needs.
Each of the UEs can initially get associated to and served by
only one BS l ∈ L, from which it receives the best signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR). We denote the associate state of each k with
an l during t as qk,l(t), which is equal to 1 when k is associated
to l and 0 otherwise. Each MNO is assumed to operate in a
different frequency to avoid interference issues for its network
[25]. Also, orthogonal transmission is adopted to avoid intra-
cell interference, while inter-cell interference is considered to
be mitigated through some form of fractional frequency reuse
scheme or sophisticated frequency allocation [26].
We assume a form of roaming-based sharing [6], according
to which UEs of different MNOs can be served by the network
of other than their subscriber MNO in a certain area, for a pre-
deﬁned period of time and at the expense of set inter-operator
charges. Each re-association event of a k to an l is considered
unique and charged by the host n with a price, c. It is noted
that each n is able to deﬁne a different c in order to serve
the trafﬁc of other MNOs. In the present paper, we propose a
roaming pricing model described in Section IV-C.
B. BS Power Consumption Model
One of our main interests is power consumption in A. Con-
sequently, we focus on network power consumption attributed
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to BSs, as a result of its signalling processes, cooling, battery
needs and transmission activity. The downlink (DL) case is
considered only, where orthogonal frequency division multiple
access (OFDMA) scheme is employed.
The power consumption of a BS l at t is calculated as [27]
Pl(t) = θl(t) ·
(
P conl +ΔPl · P txl (t)
)
, (1)
where P conl is the constant power consumption of l attributed
to signal processing, battery backup and cooling. ΔPl stands
for the variable that scales the power consumption of l with
the radiated power, due to ampliﬁer and feeder losses and P txl
refers to the transmit power of l. It is noted that P conl and ΔPl
take different values when l refers to an eNB or SC, which are
given later in the paper. Finally, each l ∈ L, has two possible
operation modes θl(t) during t: (i) active, which corresponds
to θl(t) = 1 and (ii) inactive, which corresponds to θl(t) = 0.
Thus, the power consumption of the roaming-based shared
HetNet L of all N at t is
PL(t) =
l=|L|∑
l=1
θl(t) · (P conl +ΔPl · P txl (t)). (2)
C. Channel Model
The power that a BS needs for its transmission activities,
P txl , is related to the number of its associate UEs and their
respective bit rate demands. Since we study the DL case of an
OFDMA scheme, we assume that information is transmitted in
pairs of resource blocks (RBs), with each RB being of 0.5 ms
duration in the time domain. We calculate P txl (t) of an l as
the sum of power that corresponds to the total number of RBs
that l has allocated to associate UEs during t. Denoting with
Jl(t) the allocated RBs of l, or the trafﬁc load of l as we will
call it hereafter, during t, it is
Jl(t) =
∑
k∈K(t)
qk,l(t) · jk,l(t), (3)
which results in a P txl calculated as
P txl (t) = Jl(t) · PRBl . (4)
In eq. (3), qk,l(t) denotes the associate state of a k with l at t,
jk,l(t) is the number of RBs that l has to transmit to k at t in
order to provide it with the service it has requested (i.e., the
ρk that k demands). In eq. (4), PRBl is the power consumption
for the transmission of 1 RB from BS l.
The quality of the channel between a k and an l and,
consequently, the estimated SNR of the link, SNRk,l(t)
eventually deﬁne jk,l(t) as [26]
jk,l(t) =  ρk(t)
WRBl f(SNRk,l(t))
, (5)
where WRBl is the bandwidth that corresponds to an RB pair
of l and f(SNRk,l(t)) is the spectral efﬁciency of the link
between k and l at t. We remind that ρk(t) represents the
guaranteed bit rate of k during t.
In order to calculate f(SNRk,l(t)), we ﬁrst calculate the
SNRk,l(t) as follows [26]
SNRk,l(t) = P
tx,sub
l +G
tx
l −PLk,l(t)−FLk,l−Nth−NF,
(6)
where P tx,subl represents the allocated power to each subcar-
rier of a BS l (dBm), Gtxl denotes the antenna gain (including
feeder loss, dBi), PLk,l(t) is the pathloss between k and l
at t (dB), FLk,l denotes the slow fading losses (dB), Nth
is the thermal noise and NF is the noise ﬁgure. Moreover,
we adopt the adaptive modulation and coding scheme (AMC)
over any radio link. Consequently, the appropriate SNRk,l(t)
will eventually deﬁne the modulation and coding scheme
(MCS) that will be used over the link. More speciﬁcally,
QPSK, 16QAM and 64QAM modulation schemes of dif-
ferent respective coding rates are considered. The mapping
between requested ρk(t) and SNRk,l(t) to the achievable
f(SNRk,l(t)) is executed as indicated in [21, Table A.2] [28].
As far as P tx,subl is concerned, having assumed that the
transmit power of an l, P txl , is equally distributed among its
subcarriers, P tx,subl is deﬁned as
P tx,subl =
P tx,maxl
12 · hl · Jl,max , (7)
where P tr,maxl is the maximum transmit power of l, hl stands
for the number of antennas of l and Jl,max stands for the
maximum capacity of l, i.e. the total number of RBs that l
has available for allocation. Based on this, we can calculate
PRBl of eq. (4), as
PRBl =
P tx,maxl
hl · Jl,max . (8)
IV. ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROBLEM
An aim of the present work is to increase the network
energy efﬁciency by adopting both methods of switching off
infrastructure and network sharing. The switching off method
aims at increasing energy efﬁciency by assessing the switching
off possibilities of BSs, which are underloaded or have no
load. The roaming-based network sharing method is adopted
to further facilitate the switching off procedure allowing trafﬁc
ofﬂoading to BSs of all networks. In this section, we formu-
late the HetNet energy efﬁciency maximization problem and
propose a heuristic solution to address it.
A. Energy Efﬁciency Problem Formulation
In order to increase network energy efﬁciency, denoted
as ee, through roaming-based sharing and switching off, we
consider the trafﬁc load Jl(t) of each BS l for t as the
signiﬁcant criterion for its operational state and the total
HetNet’s power consumption.
Let us express ﬁrst the total bit rate demand of all HetNet
UEs, ρL(t), in A during hour t. ρL(t) is deﬁned by the
individual bit rate demands ρk(t) of each k ∈ K (t), as well
as by their association state qk,l(t) of k with a BS l as
ρL(t) =
∑
∀k∈K(t)
∑
∀l∈L
qk,l(t) · ρk(t). (9)
Based on the above and in accordance with eq. (2), power
consumption of total HetNet L is seen analytically in eq. (10).
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PL(t) =
l=|L|∑
l=1
θl(t) ·
⎛
⎝P conl +ΔPl · P tx,maxlhl · Jl,max ·
∑
k∈K(t)
qk,l(t) ·  ρk(t)
WRBl f(SNRk,l(t))

⎞
⎠ (10)
Consequently, the network energy efﬁciency problem can
be expressed in mathematical terms as follows
max
θl,qkl
ee(θl(t), qk,l(t)) =
ρL(qk,l(t))
PL (θl(t), qk,l(t))
(11a)
s.t.
∑
∀l∈L
θl(t) ≤ |L|, θl(t) ∈ {0, 1} , (11b)
∑
∀l∈L
qk,l(t) ≤ 1, qk,l(t) ∈ {0, 1} , (11c)
Jl(t) ≤ Jl,max, (11d)∑
∀l∈L
θl(t) · Jl(t) ≤
∑
∀l∈L
Jl,max. (11e)
Constraint (11b) reassures that only the BSs of the cooperative
MNOs are studied and that a BS can interchange its operat-
ing state only between active and inactive. Constraint (11c)
ensures that a UE k can only be served by one BS l, eNB or
SC, and is considered non-associated otherwise. Moreover, the
total trafﬁc load Jl(t) of an l is limited by its own maximum
capacity, Jl,max according to constraint (11d), while the total
trafﬁc load of the active BSs in the studied network cannot
exceed the total maximum network capacity, as indicated by
constraint (11e).
The problem of eq. (11) is an NP-hard, non-linear integer
problem [29], [30]. This is due to the fact that the solu-
tion of problem in eq. (11) typically requires searching big
search trees of possible conﬁgurations of BS operation states
(θl ∈ {0, 1}) and UE associations (qk,l ∈ {0, 1}) that result
in different energy efﬁciency values. In order to address the
problem, while taking into consideration cooperation issues of
MNOs, such as which BS of which MNO to deactivate, we
propose a greedy heuristic scheme. Our proposal, Cooperative
Switching Off Algorithm (CSO), constitutes a switching off
scheme suitable for application to a multi-operator shared
HetNet and is described in detail in the following Section IV-B.
B. Cooperative Switching Off Algorithm (CSO)
We propose a greedy heuristic algorithm which aims at
reducing the energy consumption of a network by applying the
method of switching off to both eNBs and SCs [31]. At the
same time, it ofﬂoads the UEs of switched off BSs to neigh-
bouring cells of the uniﬁed HetNet, as a result of roaming-
based sharing among MNOs. The proposed scheme, namely
Cooperative Switching Off (CSO), considers as switching-off
criterion the trafﬁc load of each l ∈ L in combination with an
energy and roaming-cost related UE re-association scheme and
is of centralised application. Being a greedy heuristic scheme,
CSO follows the mentality of greedy heuristic schemes. In
detail, given a starting solution, the greedy algorithm directs it
to an updated solution that gives the largest increase (or reduc-
tion, depending on the problem) in the objective of the studied
problem. This procedure is repeated until no increase in the
objective can be obtained. CSO implements this philosophy
following four steps: (i) Initial Setting for setting the starting
solution, (ii) Execution of Greedy Component for executing the
loop that ﬁnds the solution that achieves an energy efﬁciency
increase, (iii) Acceptance criterion for updating the solutions
with the ones that achieve larger increase and (iv) Repetition
stage and Termination criterion for repeating the procedure
until no increase in the objective, i.e., increase of network
energy efﬁciency, can be obtained. CSO is executed during
low-trafﬁc hours (i.e., 00:00 - 07:00), on an hourly basis, and
is depicted in Algorithm 1 and Fig. 2. Its steps are described
as follows:
1) Initial Setting: Before the application of CSO, (t = 1),
networks are considered to be full operational (FON), i.e.,
all BSs are in active mode and no cooperation scheme exists
among MNOs. Then, BS operational states, UE association
states of FON and thus, respective network BS trafﬁc load and
energy efﬁciency of FON are set as an input for the procedures
of CSO that follow (θInl , q
In
k,l, J
In
l and ee
In
δ , respectively,
where δ represents an execution step of CSO). Otherwise, i.e.,
when t = 1, each of aforementioned values is set equal to the
respective results of hour (t− 1).
2) Execution of Greedy Component: The greedy part of
CSO constitutes the main body of the algorithm and is
composed of a BS switching off assessment along with a UE
re-association assessment. The BS switching off assessment
is described in detail in the present section. The UE re-
association assessment is presented in the present section and
described in detail in Section IV-C.
(i) BS Switching off assessment
It aims at saving energy by reducing the number of active
BSs. Number of active BSs, their respective trafﬁc load and
UE association states are assessed virtually during this part in
order to estimate their ﬁnal values. Its basic steps consist of:
• Estimation of trafﬁc demands: Expected number of UEs
K(t) with their respective bit rate demands ρk(t) for the
following hour t are estimated at the beginning of the
hour. Thus, average data trafﬁc demands are calculated
in accordance to eq. (9).
• Choice of BS for application of the switching off method:
The trafﬁc load Jl(t) of an l during t is calculated
according to eq. (3) and constitutes the criterion for
assessing switching off l during t. MNOs are sorted in
ascending order and according to their subscribed bit rate
demands to initiate switching off assessing procedure.
Then, they are studied consecutively. According to the
scheme, the eNB of studied n is assessed ﬁrst to switch
off, since eNBs are the most power consuming nodes of
the network. Despite being the most power consuming
node though, eNBs provide the highest coverage. Thus,
through the whole procedure of CSO, at least one of the
collocated eNBs, 1 ≤ l ≤ |M|, remains active in A.
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Algorithm 1 Cooperative Switching Off algorithm (CSO)
1: Set initial values θInl , q
In
k,l, J
In
l and ee
In
δ according to a
FON for t = 1 and equal to results of (t− 1) otherwise
2: Set: θl = θInl , qk,l = q
In
k,l, Jl = J
In
l , eeδ = ee
In
δ
3: Set: θV il = θ
In
l , q
V i
k,l = q
In
k,l, J
V i
l = J
In
l , ee
V i
δ = ee
In
δ ,
4: while eeδ > eeV iδ or (eeδ = eeV iδ for two times) do
5: Update ∀l ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K: θV il , qV ik,l , JV il of eeV iδ
6: for n = 1 : |N | do
7: Sort all mn ∈ Mn : θV imn = 1,mn =
∣∣M|N |∣∣, by
their load JV imn (eq. (3) for q
V i
k,l), in ascending order
8: Sort all sn ∈ Sn : by their load JV isn (eq. (3) for qV ik,l),
in ascending order
9: for l = 1 : (|Ln|) with mn ∈ Mn ﬁrst and sn ∈ Sn
following in the previously deﬁned order and as long
as l = ∣∣M|N |∣∣ do
10: for ∀k : qk,l = 1 do
11: for ∀l′ : θl′ = 1 and l′ = l do
12: Calculate SNRk,l′ =l and sort them in ascend-
ing order
13: Calculate ck,l′ for the two ﬁrst BSs of the
SNR sorted list
14: Select as ldestk the BS l
′ with the least ck,l′
15: if BS ldestk has sufﬁcient RBs then
16: Associate UE k to it and calculate current
available resources
17: else
18: Move to the next BS l′ in the sorted list
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: if ALL UEs of l are reassociated then
23: Switch off BS l
24: Update ∀l ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K:
25: end if
26: end for
27: end for
28: Calculate eeV iδ
29: δ = δ + 1
30: end while
31: Update ∀l ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K: eeδ = eeV iδ , θl = θV il ,
qk,l = q
V i
k,l , Jl = J
V i
l
Since MNOs with the least bit rate demands are assessed
ﬁrst to enhance network switching off possibilities, an
eNB of the MNO with the most trafﬁc load, l = |M|,
remains active. CSO proceeds with assessing switching
off possibilities of the rest BSs of studied n, i.e., its
SCs, which are sorted by their Jl(t) in ascending order.
CSO starts from the least loaded one. Aiming at better
coverage, SCs may transit between active and inactive
operation state over the hourly application of CSO, de-
pending on the expectations over trafﬁc demands in A
during t. Unlike SCs and in order to avoid extensive
extra power consumption, eNBs remain inactive during
all studied hours, once it is decided by CSO as such.
• Application of UE re-association scheme: Associated to
l UEs need to be ofﬂoaded to other BSs so that l can
switch off. The scheme is based on (i) the channel
conditions between a UE k and a destination BS l′ to
which k may get associated to (SNRk,l′(t)), and (ii) the
respective roaming charges. Roaming charges for k, ck,l′ ,
are considered dependent on the type and owner MNO
of l′. The UE re-association scheme and the considered
roaming charges are described in detail in Section IV-C.
• End of Greedy component: If and only if ∀k ∈ K(t)
for which qV ik,l(t) = 1, l ∈ L and l = |M|, can be re-
associated to a neighbouring l′ ∈ L, l′ = l, BS l is
eligible to switch off. Otherwise, it remains active. Virtual
variables θV il , q
V i
k,l , J
V i
l are updated ∀l ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K.
3) Acceptance criterion: If eeδ ≥ eeV iδ , then eeδ is set
equal to eeV iδ . Otherwise, it remains equal to eeδ . Depending
on the chosen value of eeδ , values of θl, qk,l are Jl updated
accordingly.
4) Repetition stage and Termination criterion: Energy ef-
ﬁciency improvement is achieved through the repeated appli-
cation of the two previous steps. As long as eeδ > eeV iδ or
eeδ = ee
V i
δ for two steps δ, the virtual values are normally
applied to (i) the real ones of the next step (δ + 1), i.e.,
eeδ+1 = ee
V i
δ , while values of θl, qk,l are Jl updated
accordingly, and (ii) to the virtual ones of the next step (δ+1),
i.e., eeV iδ+1 = ee
V i
δ , while values of θl, qk,l are Jl updated
accordingly.
C. Cooperative UA Scheme
As previously described, the re-association scheme assesses
the channel between a UE k and a neighbouring BS l′, as
well as the cost of the re-association process. Apparently,
there is a high probability for a k to associate to an eNB,
l′, 1 ≤ l′ ≤ |M|, as its transmitted signal is stronger.
Nevertheless, eNBs are at the same time more load-dependent
on power consumption. Therefore, in order to achieve further
energy saving, the re-association scheme adopts a comparison
between two l′. The comparison constitutes a form of biasing
on cell selection towards SCs ( |M| ≤ l′ ≤ |L| ), thanks to the
calculation of the re-association cost we present in eq. (12).
The re-association scheme of a UE k from a BS l to a BS l′
includes the following steps:
• For every k, k ∈ K for which qk,l = 1 with a studied
BS l: the two BSs l′1 and l
′
2 with the best , SNRk,l′1 and
SNRk,l′2 and consequently with the minimum required
RBs, jk,l′1 and jk,l′2 , are selected.
• The re-association process cost of a UE k, subscriber of
MNO n, to a destination BS l′, owned by a different
MNO n′, is calculated as
ck,l′(t) =
{
cpqk,l′(t)jk,l′(t)P
RB
l′ ΔPl′ t, n = n
′
cpqk,l′(t)jk,l′(t)P
RB
l′ ΔPl′ t+ c
n · ρk, n = n′
(12)
where cp is the ﬁxed power consumption charge (/kWh)
and cn, n ∈ N , is the inter-operator charge (/MB)
set among the co-operative MNOs for providing their
services to a roamed UE. It has to be noted that it is
possible that each MNO deﬁnes a different cn in order
to host the trafﬁc of rival MNOs.
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Figure 2. CSO ﬂowchart.
• Finally, the UE k is associated to the BS l′ which results
into the minimum re-association cost.
D. CSO Complexity
Based on the description of the CSO scheme in Sections
IV-B and IV-C, multiple searches are implemented for the
extraction of a solution from CSO. More speciﬁcally, an
initial suboptimal conﬁguration of BS operational states (θl)
and UE associations (qk,l), along with their resulting BS
trafﬁc loads (Jl) and network energy efﬁciency (ee), are
provided as an input to CSO at the beginning of a studied
period, T = [t1, t2]. Then, for each of the cooperative MNOs,
a quick-sorting of all BSs l ∈ L based on their Jl(t) is
executed. Given that quick-sort complexity is O (n · log (n))
and that no more than |N | = |L| MNOs can be found
in the studied system, the resulting complexity of CSO is
O (|L| · |L| · log (|L|)) or O
(
|L|2 · log (|L|)
)
. However, the
procedure of CSO continues with the assessment of each
BS’s switching off possibilities. In detail, for the BSs of
each of the sorted HetNets |Ln|, starting from the eNB and
proceeding to SCs, the UE re-association scheme of Section
IV-C is applied. Thus, for each associated UE k, a BS
quick-sorting in executed based on the in-between them SNR
(SNRk,l). After all the UEs of the studied to switch off l
have been considered, a BS quick-sorting may be necessary
again so that all BS trafﬁc loads, Jl(t), are updated. Given
the two quick-sorting procedures that take place and that
the maximum number of UEs that can be associated to an
l is max (|K(t)|), the complexity that is introduced by the
procedure of the switching off assessment is
O (max (|K(t)|) · |L| · log (|L|)) + O (|L| · log (|L|)) =
O (max (|K(t)|) · |L| · log (|L|)).
The total complexity of CSO then becomes:
O
(
|L|2 · log (|L|)
)
· O (max (|K(t)|) · |L| · log (|L|)) =
O
(
max (|K(t)|) · |L|3 · log2 (|L|)
)
= O
(
|L|3 · log2 (|L|)
)
.
It is noted though that for realistic scenarios, CSO can
provide results in acceptable executable time.
V. COST ALLOCATION PROBLEM
The proposed energy efﬁcient solution is based on network
sharing. Thus, MNOs need to be permanently motivated to
refrain from an individual application of the switching off
method and instead keep their cooperation holding. The lat-
ter presumes not only that cooperative MNOs reduce their
expenses, but also that a fair cost allocation among them is
adopted. A predeﬁned and applied on an set basis agreement
could achieve the desirable proﬁtability and fairness. The cost
that will be allocated to each MNO after its participation
in a coalition agreement should mirror its contribution to
the network cost savings acquired from the application of
CSO algorithm. Moreover, revenues obtained from the roamed
trafﬁc served by rival host MNOs should not be neglected. The
ﬁnal cost allocation should be validated as fair by each MNO
n ∈ N , meanwhile being proﬁtable in comparison to its non-
cooperative action.
A. Cost allocation Problem Formulation
Let Ω ⊆ N be a coalition of MNOs who cooperate in
order to apply the switching off algorithm CSO on their shared
network. Each coalition Ω leads to an amount of total cost
EL {Ω} due to energy consumption of formed HetNet, which
all MNOs n ∈ Ω are responsible to share and pay. Given that
we study the low-trafﬁc hours, which correspond to a period
T = [t1, t2] and that PL
n
is calculated according to eq. (10),
with Ln and ln instead of L and l, respectively, EL {Ω} is
EL {Ω} = cp
∑
n∈Ω
∑
t∈T
PL
n
t. (13)
If φn {Ω} is the part of EL {Ω} that each n ∈ Ω will
eventually take on to pay, we will proceed to its calculation
by deﬁning (i) the roaming revenues corresponding to each n
when it participates in coalition Ω, revn {Ω}, (ii) the contri-
bution Φ′n {Ω} of each n to the total cost savings, SEL {Ω},
between a cooperative and non-cooperative application of CSO
and (ii) the expenses ψn of n when it individually (non-
cooperatively) applies CSO, as follows
φn {Ω} = ψn − Φ′n {Ω} − revn {Ω} . (14)
Parameters ψn and revn {Ω} of n ∈ Ω can be easily calcu-
lated. More speciﬁcally, it is
ψn =
∑
t∈T
cpP Ind,n(t)t, (15)
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where P Ind,n(t) denotes the power consumption of Ln in a
non-cooperative application of CSO, in accordance with eq.
(10), with Ln and ln instead of L and l, and
revn {Ω} =∑
t∈T
∑
kn∈Kn
∑
ln /∈Ln
(
cpqkn,ln (t)jkn,ln (t)P
RB
ln ΔPln t+ c
n′pkn (t)
)
,
(16)
where n′ is the MNO of coalition Ω to which UE k is re-
associated to and is other that provider n ∈ Ω.
Unlike revn {Ω} and ψn of n ∈ Ω though, calculation of
contribution Φ′n {Ω} to energy cost savings SEL {Ω} impli-
cates fairness issues, as other MNOs contribute to cost saving
mainly by BS switching off and others mainly by serving
ofﬂoaded trafﬁc. It is possible that cooperative MNOs could
proceed to an equal allocation of cost savings SEL {Ω} among
them in order to determine Φ′n {Ω} or proceed to an allocation
based on their individual action. However, such strategies
could result into a cost distribution that would possibly be
unfair to other MNOs. Thus, we propose a more cooperative
approach that could set aside possible fairness issues and
provide an applicable solution to the described problem. To
this end, we propose a centralised solution by modelling the
energy allocation problem as a bankruptcy game.
A bankruptcy game combines the characteristics of a
bankruptcy problem [20], [21] and cooperative games [22].
A bankruptcy game is deﬁned by a speciﬁc entity that needs
to be allocated among a group of players. Each of the players
makes a claim on the obtained entity, while the sum of the
players’ claims cannot exceed it. A utility function is set for the
game, according to cooperative game theory, which eventually
allocates to each player a part of the entity, i.e., the payoff.
As a consequence, SEL {Ω} constitutes an entity that has
to be completely allocated among the cooperative MNOs of a
coalition Ω ⊆ N so that Φ′n {Ω} and eventually φn {Ω} can be
determined. Taking into consideration that different coalitions
Ω can be formed among the MNOs, SEL {Ω} is calculated
as follows
SEL {Ω} =
∑
n∈Ω
ψn − EL {Ω} . (17)
It is noted that ψn is calculated according to eq. (15) and
serves as an upper limit of the eagerness of n to participate in
coalition Ω. In other words, no MNO would be interested in
paying an amount of cost greater than ψn while, at the same
time, no MNO could save more money than ψn for a coalition
in the case of a cooperation. Thus, ψn represents the claim or
“marginal cost”, as we will name it hereafter.
The obtained allocation problem of the cost savings
SEL {Ω} can be modelled as a bankruptcy problem, B, which
allocates to each n its contribution to the network cost savings,
Φ′n {Ω} and can be expressed in mathematical terms as
B =
{ (
SEL {Ω} , ψn ∈ R++ ×R|Ω|+
)
:
SEL {Ω} ≤∑n∈Ω ψn,
}
(18)
We use the coalitional game theory, and more speciﬁcally,
the theory of coalitional games of transferable utility (TU), in
order to deﬁne the characteristic function, VB , VB : 2N ×R,
which will evaluate each bankruptcy problem B and associate
it to a real value:
VB (Ω) =
{
min
{
ψn∈Ω, SEL {Ω} −
∑
n/∈Ω ψn
}
, Ω = {n}
min
{∑
n∈Ω VB ({n}) , SEL {Ω} −
∑
n/∈Ω ψn
}
,Ω = {n} .
(19)
It is noted that if VB (Ω) <
(
SEL − ∑n/∈Ω ψn), then
VB (Ω) = 0, since the entity cannot be totally allocated to the
cooperative MNOs.
Given the fact that SEL {Ω} is in any case deﬁned only
by the player MNOs who participate in the coalition, (19)
becomes
VB (Ω) =
{
min
{
ψn∈Ω, SEL {Ω}
}
, Ω = {n}
min
{∑
n∈Ω VB ({n}) , SEL {Ω}
}
,Ω = {n} , (20)
with VB (Ω) = 0 when VB (Ω) < SEL. Based on eq. (20),
the value of the game among MNOs of coalition Ω, VB (Ω),
is calculated based on the game values in case of an MNO
individual activity, i.e., when Ω = {n}.
Payoff of cost savings for each n, Φ′n {Ω} or Φ′n (VB(Ω)),
as it can be written in the case of the B game with utility
function VB , is subjected to the following constraints so that
the bankruptcy game holds:
• The sum of allocated payoffs should equal VB(Ω):∑
n∈Ω
Φ′n (VB(Ω)) = VB(Ω). (21)
• The payoff of a player n in a coalition Ω should not be
less than the respective one of the player’s stand-alone
action:
Φ′n ({n}) ≤ Φ′n (VB(Ω)) . (22)
• A player n cannot receive a higher payoff than its claim,
so that fairness is preserved.
0 ≤ Φ′n (VB(Ω)) ≤ ψn. (23)
B. Bankruptcy game with Shapley Value
We use Shapley Value (SV) to determine the payoffs,
Φ′n (VB(Ω)), of each n ∈ Ω, player of the bankruptcy game,
with (20) set as the characteristic function which corresponds
each game to a value. SV has the important characteristic of
quantifying the contribution of a player, i.e., its worth and
value, in a game when the player joins a coalition, which
highly motivated us to selected it as part of our solution.
Similarly, in the present work, SV rewards a player n with
a payoff Φ′n (VB(Ω)) according to its contribution in the
obtained cost which. SV is based on four basic axioms [22]:
• Efﬁciency axiom:
∑
n∈Ω Φ
′
n (VB(Ω)) = VB (Ω).
• Symmetry axiom: if two players n1 and n2 are
such that VB (Ω ∪ {n1}) = VB (Ω ∪ {n2}), for ev-
ery coalition Ω containing the player n1 and n2, then
Φ′n1 (VB(Ω)) = Φ
′
n2 (VB(Ω)).
• Dummy axiom: If a player n is such that
VB (Ω) = VB (Ω ∪ {n}), for every coalition Ω
not containing n, then Φ′n (VB(Ω)) = 0.
• Additivity axiom: if u and v are characteristic functions,
then Φ′ (u+ v) = Φ′ (v + u) = Φ′ (u) + Φ′ (v).
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Figure 3. Flowchart of the bankruptcy Shapley Value based cost allocation scheme (BSV).
SV payoff of a player in a game when it joins coalition Ω,
is computed based on the chosen utility function of the game,
VB , as follows [22]
Φ′n (VB(Ω)) =
∑
Ω⊆N\{n}
|Ω|!(N−|Ω|−1)!
N !
[VB (Ω ∪ {n})− VB (Ω)] .
(24)
With the contribution Φ′n (VB(Ω)) deﬁned from SV, the cost
φn {Ω} that each n will eventually take on to pay can be calcu-
lated according to eq. (14). Our proposal, namely bankruptcy
Shapley Value based cost allocation scheme (BSV), is pre-
sented in Fig. 3.
Aiming at further portraying the fairness of the allocated
cost to each MNO, φn {Ω}, we employ an expectation index,
EIn {Ω}, corresponding to each n ∈ Ω deﬁned as
EIn {Ω} = (ψn − φn {Ω})
ψn
, ∀n ∈ Ω, (25)
where φn {Ω} and ψn are calculated according to eq. (14)
and (15), respectively. The meaning of EIn {Ω} is to portray
a metric of satisfaction for an n between the case of being in
a coalition Ω and opting for an individual action, based on the
achieved cost difference. An estimation for the whole method’s
fairness is extracted based on the mean value of EIn {Ω}.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We implemented a system-level simulator in MATLAB to
examine the performance of the proposed CSO algorithm and
bankruptcy cost allocation scheme. In the present section, the
considered simulation scenario and the respective performance
evaluation results are presented.
A. Simulation Scenario
We study seven macrocell sized areas A, with correspon-
dence to the system model described in Section III. Without
loss of generality, we focus on the case when |N | = 3 MNOs
are active in each A. We consider that all MNOs are motivated
to cooperate, aiming at maximizing the energy savings of their
shared network and then proceed in balancing their expenses
in a fair way. We consider uniform UE distribution in each A,
with all MNOs having similar trafﬁc load patterns of sinusoidal
form, approaching the trafﬁc pattern in [8], unless otherwise
stated. Their trafﬁc loads, expressed in number of UEs, are
equal to ξ · ∣∣K1∣∣, ∣∣K2∣∣ = 2 · ξ · ∣∣K1∣∣ and ∣∣K3∣∣ = 3 · ξ · ∣∣K1∣∣.
Parameter ξ is a multiplicative real-number factor, ξ ∈ ,
that is multiplied by the whole MNO trafﬁc pattern curve,
differentiating the load magnitudes for each MNO. Unless
otherwise stated, ξ is set equal to 1. The network infrastructure
in each A is in total |L| = 45 with ∣∣L1∣∣ = 11 , ∣∣L2∣∣ = 15
and
∣∣L3∣∣ = 19. One eNB corresponds to each of the three
MNOs from the aforementioned infrastructure. The eNBs are
collocated in the centre of each A, while the rest, i.e., the
SCs, are uniformly distributed in it. We assume two possible
operational states for the BSs, active and inactive and represent
their state with the θl value, as mentioned in Section III-B.
All MNOs adopt orthogonal LTE-A transmission of bandwidth
Wl = 20 MHz. Therefore Jl,max = 100 RBs, ∀l ∈ L [28]. We
set |I| = 3 classes of data throughput demands. Thus, a UE k
may require ρ1 = 1.5 Mbps, ρ2 = 1 Mbps or ρ3 = 0.75 Mbps
with random probability gk,i ∈ [0, 1]. We set cp = 0.1 /kWh
as a cost corresponding to power consumption while the inter-
operator roaming charge is set equal to cn = 0.003 /MB
[32]. Each k, k ∈ K is initially associated to an l, l ∈ Ln
that is owned by the MNO n to which k is subscribed and
that provides the highest SNRk,l. We set the threshold SNR
for the establishment of a channel SNRthreshold = −10 dB
[28]. The present study focuses on the low trafﬁc hours of a
day (00 : 00)− (07 : 00), when switching off probabilities are
higher. The rest of the simulation parameters are summarized
in Table I [8], [27], [28], [33].
The proposed CSO algorithm is compared with (i) a full
operational network (FON), when all l ∈ L are in active
mode and no cooperation scheme exists among MNOs, (ii) an
Individual network operation according to the proposed CSO
(IndSO), when each MNO n ∈ N individually applies the
switching off scheme of CSO, (iii) a random switching off
scheme (RSO), when MNOs apply both the switching off and
roaming-based network sharing method by switching off half
BSs of the united network in a random manner so that the
geographic area corresponding to a switched off BS, l′ ∈ L is
covered by the remaining active ones [23] and (iv) a switching
off scheme that is based on a power saving efﬁciency indicator
Q and to which we will hereafter refer to as Q-base switching
off scheme (QSO) [12]. As QSO is designed for a single-
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Table I
SIMULATION PARAMETER VALUES
Parameter Value
hl≤|M| 6
hl>|M| 2
P tx,max
l≤|M| 46 dBm
P tx,max
l>|M| 30 dBm
Gtx
k,l≤|M| 15 dBi
Gtx
k,l>|M| 5 dBi
PLk,l≤|M| 128.1+37.6logdk,l,d in km
PLk,l>|M| 140.7+36.7logdk,l,d in km
Nth -174 dBm/Hz
NF 5 dB
ΔPl≤|M| 21.45
ΔPl>|M| 7.4
P con
l≤|M| 354.44 W
P con
l>|M| 71 W
operator system model, we adjust it in our results for a multi-
operator one by using a roaming-based shared network with
trafﬁc ofﬂoading to an eNB with available resources and giving
priority to the eNB of their provider MNO. We also apply QSO
on an hourly basis, as in our work.
The proposed BSV cost allocation scheme is compared with
(i) an equal cost allocation (EQ) among the cooperative MNOs
participants of a coalition Ω, when each n takes on the respon-
sibility of paying an equal part of the network expenses except
from the roaming revenues and (ii) the Generalized Ibn Ezra
(GIE) Value [21], when the allocated cost φGIEn
(
EHet, ψn
)
to each MNO n is dependent on their marginal costs, ψn.
Moreover, when necessary, we consider in our results the case
when no cost allocation strategy is adopted (NoCA).
Finally, network energy efﬁciency (bits/Joule) and the cor-
responding network operation cost () were used as indica-
tive metrics for the validation of the algorithms performance
results. Concerning the MNO satisfaction from the cost allo-
cation methods, we use as a metric the EI which is given in
(25), while the mean value of the EI is used for assessing the
overall fairness of the methods.
B. Performance Results
Fig. 4 depicts the average network energy efﬁciency for
the studied area throughout the low-trafﬁc hours with the
consideration of four different switching off schemes that were
described in Section VI-A: IndSO, RSO, QSO and CSO.
It can be observed that CSO outperforms its counterparts
throughout the studied hours, since it manages to serve the
same amount of trafﬁc with less active infrastructure. QSO,
performs worse than CSO in spite of the network sharing
assumption, as it ofﬂoads trafﬁc only to eNBs and does not
exploit the available resources of other SCs, as CSO does.
QSO though outperforms IndSO and RSO. On one hand,
IndSO is outperformed by both CSO and QSO, because it does
not apply network sharing. Moreover, in an A, IndSO keeps
the eNBs of each MNO active and adjusts the operational
states of SCs to trafﬁc variations. In comparison to QSO,
this results in higher power consumption for IndSO and thus,
in lower network energy efﬁciency. On the other hand, RSO
limits the amount of active infrastructure to half to save energy
and provide coverage. In each A thus, more than one eNB may
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Figure 4. Average hourly network energy efﬁciency vs. switching off schemes.
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with night peak MNO trafﬁc proﬁles.
remain active, along with some underloaded SCs, which results
in a poorer performance in comparison to its counterparts.
Interesting is the fact that when trafﬁc is a bit higher, i.e.,
00:00-01:00, IndSO is outperformed by RSO, as the latter
exploits more efﬁciently the active infrastructure. On the other
hand, IndSO performs better than RSO for the rest of studied
hours, since IndSO adjusts to trafﬁc variations with SCs. In
order to quantify the differences to its counterparts, it can be
noticed that CSO can achieve an increase in energy efﬁciency
between 55–78% in comparison to IndSO, between 66–107%
in comparison to RSO and 43–50% in comparison to QSO.
In order to study the performance of CSO under different
trafﬁc scenarios, we have also assumed a scenario where the
load peaks of all MNOs take place during the night hours
(e.g., at a student residence) in Fig. 5. A general comment for
Fig. 5 is that all studied schemes are more energy efﬁcient
in comparison to their respective performances in Fig. 4,
because higher trafﬁc load is served by the networks. Among
all schemes, CSO is the most energy efﬁcient one, as it serves
the trafﬁc with less power consumption. In detail, it is mainly
the network of MNO 3, that serves the majority of trafﬁc. Its
infrastructure is quite loaded, while some SCs of the other
MNOs remain active as well. The MNO cooperation though
allows eNBs and several SCs to switch off, which leads to
energy savings. Although CSO performs better than all its
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switching off schemes.
counterparts in Fig. 5 as in Fig. 4, the performance results
of the rest considered schemes have been altered. RSO has
now the second best performance. It is outperformed only by
CSO, because it keeps more eNBs active in each A. However,
its energy efﬁciency results are better than those of QSO and
IndSO. With RSO, more trafﬁc is served by SCs, whereas with
QSO and IndSO, all eNBS are active and take on the majority
of trafﬁc. QSO is outperformed by IndSO in the present
ﬁgure despite the adoption of network sharing, because IndSO
applies ofﬂoading to both eNBs and SCs, whereas QSO allows
SC trafﬁc ofﬂoading only to eNBs. Concluding, in Fig. 5, CSO
achieves an increase in energy efﬁciency between 49–87% in
comparison to IndSO, between 22–37% in comparison to RSO
and 143–174% in comparison to QSO.
In an effort to obtain further insights on the performance
of the studied schemes in relevance to energy efﬁciency, we
assume different trafﬁc load analogies among the cooperating
MNOs, for the normal sinusoidal trafﬁc pattern. The respective
results are apparent in Fig. 6. Having already assumed MNOs
of different trafﬁc load, as described in Section VI-A, a
cooperation among MNOs whose trafﬁc load discrepancies
change could result in a different load ofﬂoading among BSs
and thus alter the energy efﬁciency of the considered system
for the different switching off schemes. According to Fig. 6,
CSO outperforms its counterparts for low and high trafﬁc
load differences, as they change by ξ, thanks to the joint
consideration of its switching off and infrastructure sharing
scheme. At the same time though, CSO improves its energy
efﬁciency by 103.5% among the different cases of trafﬁc load
analogy, while the respective numbers for its counterparts are
184.2% for QSO, 260.9% for RSO, 241.8% for IndSO and
292.7% for FON. The more moderate responses to trafﬁc load
changes of CSO, QSO and IndSO in comparison to RSO and
FON are attributed to the fact that the former increase the
percentage of active infrastructure to cover the trafﬁc, whereas
the latter maintain it stable.
The content of Fig. 6 is extended in Fig. 7 out of interest
to assess the effects of the different coalitions that MNOs can
form on the performance of CSO, in terms of energy efﬁciency.
In more detail, three kinds of coalition can be noticed: (i)
one MNO (blue dashed line), (ii) two MNOs (black dotted
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line) and (iii) three MNOs (pink solid line) applying the CSO
scheme. It has to be noted that a coalition with one MNO
(case (i)) represents the application of the IndSO scheme, as
it was described in Section VI-A. According to the ﬁgure,
in most cases, IndSO proves to be less energy efﬁcient in
comparison to any other coalition MNOs can form, since it
does not allow MNOs to reap the beneﬁts of sharing, i.e.,
ofﬂoading their trafﬁc to any BS of the area. Comparing a
coalition of two and three MNOs, the coalition of three proves
to be more energy efﬁcient that a coalition of two. Even though
the amount of trafﬁc that needs to be ofﬂoaded increases with
the consideration of more cooperative MNOs, the trafﬁc can
be better distributed among the extra infrastructure that is
available from the extra participant MNO, increasing thus the
network energy efﬁciency.
Fig. 8 is an introduction to the distribution of costs to
each of three considered MNOs in the case (i) when all
MNOs act individually and thus no cost allocation method
is necessary (IndSO-NoCA). MNOs, however, are responsible
for the expenses of their own network. Case (ii) corresponds to
a coalition of the three MNOs, with no cost allocation method
being adopted (CSO-NoCA). Instead, MNOs are responsible
for the cost corresponding to their active infrastructure and
roaming revenues. Finally, case (iii) represents a union of
MNOs in a coalition of three and the adoption of the proposed
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Figure 9. Allocation of the cost to cooperative MNOs considering different cost allocation methods before and after the consideration of inter-operator
roaming revenues.
BSV cost allocation method (CSO-BSV). As can be seen, in
the CSO-NoCA case, there is a big decrease of 79.6% and
63.2% for the network costs of MNOs 1 and 2, respectively,
in comparison to the IndSO-NoCA case, as they are the MNOs
whose infrastructure is assessed ﬁrst to switch off, according
to the CSO algorithm. Despite the fact that the beneﬁts of
infrastructure sharing are already apparent for MNOs 1 and 2,
MNO 3 notices an increase of 14% in its costs, since it takes
on the majority of the trafﬁc. With the need for applying a fair
cost allocation procedure among the cooperative MNOs being
highlighted, the respective results for the CSO-BSV case are
included in Fig. 8 as well. BSV cost allocation indicates as
well a decrease of 32.8% and 12.9% in the costs of MNOs 1
and 2 respectively, in comparison to their respective marginal
cost, i.e., IndSO-NoCA case. Both cost reductions, however,
are more limited in comparison to the CSO-NoCA case, as
BSV allows MNOs 1 and 2 to take on a larger share of the total
costs. As far as MNO 3 is concerned, a big decrease of 65.4%
is noticed in its allocated cost between the IndSO-NoCA and
CSO-BSV cases, in contrast to the cost increase noticed in
the CSO-NoCA one. The BSV cost allocation method rewards
the contribution of MNO 3 to provide service to the ofﬂoaded
trafﬁc for limiting its switching off possibilities. MNO 3 thus
is ultimately motivated to remain in the coalition. The consid-
eration of Shapley Value, which is used in BSV, contributes so
that all MNOs reduce their expenses and remain encouraged to
share their networks by adopting a cost allocation that portrays
each one’s contribution to the cost savings.
Fig. 9 presents the cost distribution among the MNOs who
participate in a coalition Ω, as a result of different cost allo-
cation methods. On one hand, Fig. 9(a) displays the inﬂuence
of the considered methods on the cost that is attributed to
the network power consumption. EQ cost allocation does not
take into consideration any individual contribution of each
MNO and thus the allocated costs are equal. The GIE method,
being based on the declared marginal cost of each MNO,
results in a more balanced cost allocation vector, especially
between MNOs 1 and 3. Lastly, given that the BSV method
portrays the contribution of each MNO to the cost savings,
it approaches the GIE method. On the other hand, Fig. 9(b)
depicts the results of Fig. 9(a), as they are formed after the
consideration of each MNO’s respective roaming revenues,
revn. The results of Fig. 9(b) constitute the ﬁnal allocated
costs. When roaming charges are considered after an EQ
cost allocation, big discrepancies appear between MNO 3 and
MNOs 1, 2. According to the ﬁgure, MNOs 1 and 2 approach
their marginal costs and MNO 3 considerably beneﬁts from the
roaming charges. Undoubtedly, the big differences of 257.7%
and 424.2% between MNO 3 and MNOs 1 and 2, respectively
in their allocated costs, raise questions on the fairness of
the method. The GIE and BSV methods however, manage
to reduce the big gap between MNO 3 and MNOs 1 and 2,
thanks to their criteria. BSV achieves a more balanced cost
allocation between MNO 3 and MNOs 1 and 2, with respective
differences of 44.3% and 123.1%, in comparison to GIE,
where the respective differences are equal to 85.3% and
163.1%. It has to be noted that, for the three methods, MNO
2 has the least decrease in its allocated cost due to its large
roamed trafﬁc load, which induces larger roaming expenses.
The satisfaction of MNOs from the distribution of cost
among them, as it was extracted from the different cost
allocation methods (Fig. 9(b)), is expressed in Fig. 10, via the
EI metric of (25). Moreover, the CSO-NoCA case of Fig. 8 is
also included in the results. According to the ﬁgure, MNO 3
has a negative EI in the NoCA case, as the fact that it takes
on the majority of the trafﬁc results in increased expenses. It
is noticed that when a cost allocation strategy is applied, EI
of MNO 3 increases, indicating its satisfaction over the fact
that it received a cost reduction as a payoff for providing a
considerable part of its network capacity to cover the trafﬁc of
MNOs 1 and 2. On the other hand, MNOs 1 and 2, are more
satisﬁed in the NoCA case, i.e., they have higher EI, since
they have to pay only for the power consumption of their
limited active infrastructure. When a cost allocation method is
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXX 2017 13
Studied Method
No CA EQ GIE BSV
E
I
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
MNO1
MNO2
MNO3
Figure 10. MNO EI vs. cost allocation methods.
Analogy factor ξ
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
M
ea
n 
E
I
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
EQ
GIE
 BSV
Figure 11. Mean EI of each cost allocation method vs. analogy factor ξ for
the MNO trafﬁc loads.
applied, MNOs 1 and 2 have to take on a larger part of the total
network expenses, limiting their individual satisfaction from
the cooperation. However, an adoption of a cost allocation
method leads to a more balanced distribution of the cost and
consequently the reassurance of a minimal satisfaction of all
cooperative MNOs. Among the cost allocation methods, the
EQ one results in the most unbalanced MNO satisfaction,
favouring MNO 3. However, GIE and BSV balance the EQ’s
method differences of EI for the cooperative MNOs thanks
to the adoption of cost allocation criteria (marginal cost and
saved energy contribution respectively), with the BSV criteria
achieving the most balanced EI for the cooperative MNOs.
Having considered the results of Fig. 10, it is only rational
to assume that the BSV balanced cost allocation among all
the cooperative MNOs, which is also representative of their
contribution to the achieved reduction of the cost, is a more
fair option to follow. Fig. 11 conﬁrms the latter conclusion
with the display of the mean EI of each cost allocation method,
EQ, GIE and BSV, versus the analogy factor ξ of the MNO
trafﬁc loads. According to the obtained results, all studied
methods provide a fairness of similar levels in the system
for various trafﬁc load differences among the MNOs. Despite
the fact that all studied cost allocation methods result in close
performance, especially when trafﬁc load differences are vague
among the MNOs, the performance gap among the methods
slightly expands as trafﬁc load differences intensify as well.
The BSV method though presents a slight precedence that is
attributed to the use of Shapley Value, as the latter manages
to quantify the contribution of each MNO to cost savings for
the ﬁnal extraction of their allocated costs. The GIE method,
being based to the criterion of the marginal cost of each MNO
performs close, though still below, to BSV for the various
trafﬁc load abnormalities. Finally, there is a slightly more
intense deterioration in the performance of the EQ method in
comparison to the others as the differences in the trafﬁc load
volume of each MNO broaden, which indicates the necessity
of adopting fairer cost allocation criteria.
VII. CONCLUSION
With a view to the expected increase in the trafﬁc load
volume during the following years, the possibility for MNOs
to switch off infrastructure along with a possible cooperation
among them expand the expectations for a greener operation
of the telecommunication infrastructure that will reduce OpEx
and CO2 emissions and increase energy savings. At the same
time though, fairness issues over the cost allocation among the
cooperative MNOs which could jeopardise their willingness
for a cooperation are raised. In this paper, we introduced a
switching off algorithm, CSO, which can achieve an energy
efﬁcient operation of the network during the low trafﬁc hours,
when the infrastructure is underloaded and exploit the beneﬁts
of network sharing by roaming trafﬁc to the networks of all
cooperative MNOs. By taking into consideration the different
types of BSs composing the HetNet and their owner MNO, as
well as the channel quality among BSs and UEs in the studied
area, the proposed scheme assesses the best candidate BS to
switch off, implements a roaming cost based cooperative UA
scheme to ofﬂoad trafﬁc and eventually deﬁnes the operational
state of the BSs in the area. The obtained results highlight
not only the potential energy efﬁciency gains of the network,
but also the potential cost savings. In order to address the
fairness issues over the cost allocation among MNOs who
cooperate, we proposed a bankruptcy game as a cost allocation
method, BSV, which is Shapley Value based and thus takes
into account each MNO’s contribution to network cost savings
according to their power consumption cost in a cooperative
and non-cooperative case. The proposed BSV cost allocation
scheme eventually determines the ﬁnal cost to be allocated to
each MNO based on their corresponding roaming revenues.
According to the extracted results, the adaptability of the
proposed scheme to provide a balanced cost allocation among
MNOs for their different trafﬁc loads while managing to be
overall satisfying as well, is projected.
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